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The plaintiff/appellant, John Panos, pursuant to Rule 24 (a) 
of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits the following 
Appellant's Brief. 
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(k). This is an appeal from the Order 
Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, of the Third Judicial 
District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, the Honorable 
Anne M. Stirba presiding. That Order granted dismissal in favor of 
the defendant, Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., dismissing the 
plaintiff's complaint with prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The following issue is presented to this Court for review: 
1. Did the trial court err in concluding that the March 11, 
1992 dismissal was a dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41 
(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, as opposed to a dismissal 
without prejudice under Rule 4-103 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue on appeal involves a legal conclusion by the trial 
court. That legal conclusion will be given no difference by this 
Court and will be reviewed for legal correctness. Alf v. State 
Farm Fire and Casualty Co., 850 P.2d 1272 (Utah 1993). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
The interpretation of the following statutory provision is 
determinative of the issues on appeal. The language of these 
designated statutes of these designated rules is set out in the 
Addendum to this Appellants1 brief, pursuant to Rule 24 (f) (2) of 
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure: 
Rule 4-103 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration; 
Rule 41 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case 
This is an appeal from a final Order of the Third 
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, the 
Honorable Anne M. Stirba presiding. Judge Stirba granted the 
defendant's Motion to Dismiss, dismissing the plaintiff's complaint 
with prejudice. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On June 30, 1994, the plaintiff filed his complaint in 
the Third Judicial District Court, Civil No. 940904176. (R. 279-
283). The defendant moved to dismiss the plaintiff's complaint 
asserting that a previous dismissal in Panos v. Smiths Food & Drug 
Centers, Inc.. Civil No. 910901425 PI, Third Judicial District 
Court, was a dismissal with prejudice disposing of the plaintiff's 
complaint. The plaintiff argued that the previous dismissal was a 
dismissal without prejudice and did not dispose of his claim 
against the defendant. 
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Hearing on the defendant's Motion to Dismiss came before Judge 
Stirba on January 23, 1995. At that hearing, Judge Stirba 
concluded that the March 11, 1992 dismissal was a dismissal with 
prejudice under Rule 41 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(R.354-356). This appeal followed (R. 357-358). 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. On or about February 21, 1991, attorney Anthony M. 
Thurber filed the complaint in Panos v. Smith's Food & Drug 
Centers. Inc., Civil No. 910901425 PI, Third District Court, on 
behalf of the plaintiff, alleging that the defendant was negligent 
and responsible for the injuries the plaintiff sustained in a slip-
and-fall on June 30, 1990. (R. 2-5). 
2. On November 13, 1991, the court sent an Order to Show 
Cause to Thurber as to why the case should not be dismissed for 
failure to prosecute. (R. 8-9). 
3. On December 11, 1991, Thurber appeared before Judge 
Moffat at a hearing on the Order to Show Cause. In a Minute Entry, 
after the hearing, Judge Moffat ordered as follows: 
Counsel have until March 11, 1992 to settle this case or 
file a Certificate of Readiness for Trial. If neither 
are done, the case will be dismissed without further 
notice to counsel. (R. 10). 
4. On or about March 11, 1992, the Court entered an Order of 
Dismissal, which provided: 
The court finds that the Certificate of Readiness has not 
yet been filed and the file does not reflect that this 
case has ben settled. 
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Therefore, the court on its own motion orders that this 
case hereby DISMISSED. (R. 11). 
5. On October 30, 1992, Thurber withdrew as counsel for the 
plaintiff. (R. 12-13). 
6. On January 14, 1993, Gordon K. Jensen entered his 
appearance as counsel for the plaintiff. (R. 15-16). 
7. When Jensen received the litigation file from Thurber, 
all it contained was a copy of the Summons and Complaint. No order 
to show cause documents or the order of dismissal were included. 
(R. 240-242). 
8. After Jensen entered his appearance as counsel for the 
plaintiff, the case moved forward through discovery, with both 
parties exchanging interrogatories and requests for production of 
documents and taking various depositions, including the depositions 
of the plaintiff and employees of the defendant. (R. 240-242). 
9. At the completion of significant discovery, the defendant 
filed a motion for summary judgment on liability issues. (R. 38-
39). 
10. Both the plaintiff and the defendant briefed those 
liability issues. Hearing on the defendant's motion for summary 
judgment was scheduled for Friday, June 17, 1994 before Judge 
Ronald 0. Hyde, sitting in for Judge Moffat. (R. 334-336). 
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19. At that hearing, Judge Stirba concluded that the March 
11, 1992 dismissal was a dismissal with prejudice under Rule 41(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. (R. 354-356). This appeal 
followed.(R.357-358). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in concluding that the March 11, 1992 
Order of Dismissal was a dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Rule 
41 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The March 11, 1992 
dismissal was a dismissal without prejudice pursuant to Rule 4-103 
of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
ARGUMENT 
THE MARCH 11, 1992 DISMISSAL WAS WITHOUT 
PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE UNDER RULE 
4-103 OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION. 
IT WAS NOT A DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE UNDER 
RULE 41(b) OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL 
PROCEDURE. 
Rule 4-103(2), (3), of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration provides as follows: 
(2) If a certificate of readiness for trial has not been 
served and filed within 180 days of the filing date and 
absent of showing of good cause, the court shall dismiss 
the case without prejudice for lack of prosecution. 
(3) Any party may, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, move to vacate a dismissal entered under this 
rule. 
Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in 
pertinent part as follows: 
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11. At the June 17, 1994 hearing on the defendant's motion 
for summary judgment, Judge Hyde informed counsel that his file 
reflected that Judge Moffat had dismissed the plaintiff's case back 
in March of 1992, when Anthony Thurber was representing the 
plaintiff. (R. 334-336). 
12. That was the first time Jensen or the plaintiff, who 
attended the hearing, had heard of that prior dismissal. (R. 334-
336; 344). 
13. After discussion between Judge Hyde and both counsel, it 
was decided that the appropriate way to proceed would be for the 
plaintiff to file a motion to vacate the prior dismissal. Judge 
Hyde's ruling on this motion would govern further proceedings in 
that case. (R. 334-336). 
14. Hearing on that motion was held on Friday, June 24, 1994 
at 8:45 a.m. (R. 334-336). 
15. At that hearing, Judge Hyde denied the plaintiff's motion 
to vacate dismissal, but declined to rule on whether the March 11, 
1992 dismissal was with or without prejudice. (R. 334-336). 
16. On June 30, 1994, the plaintiff filed his complaint in 
Civil No. 940904176 PI, Third District Court. (R. 279-283). 
17. The defendant moved to dismiss that complaint asserting 
that the March 11, 1992 dismissal was with prejudice. (R. 286-287, 
288-306). 
18. Those issues were briefed and a hearing was held on 
January 23, 1995. (R. 349-350). 
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(b) Involuntary Dismissal: effect thereof. For failure 
of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these 
rules or any order of the court, a defendant may move for 
dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. . . 
. unless the court in its order for dismissal otherwise 
specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any 
dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue 
or for lack of an indispensable party, operates as an 
adjudication upon the merits. 
Rule 4-103 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration and 
Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure directly conflict 
in that Rule 4-103 specifically provides that a dismissal for 
failure to prosecute is without prejudice, while Rule 41(b) 
provides that such a dismissal is with prejudice. 
C&se law and factual background of this case support that the 
March H / 1992 dismissal was without prejudice. What happened in 
this case is clear. Through no fault of Panos or his current 
counsel, his complaint was dismissed based on an order to show 
cause. Panosfs previous lawyer had represented that the case would 
be settled or a certification of readiness for trial filed within 
three months of the order to show cause hearing. For whatever 
reason, Panosfs prior counsel did not comply with that deadline and 
the case was dismissed pursuant to Rule 4-103 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration. 
It is clear that the dismissal was based on Rule 4-103 as a 
part of this Court's civil calendar management system. The order 
to show cause of November 13, 1991 was designated "No. 1", 
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clarifying that it was sent out pursuant to the court's internal 
calendar management system. 
Panos's current counsel entered his appearance in January of 
1993 and the case has moved forward through substantial discovery 
to the point where a dispositive motion was filed by the defendant 
on liability issues. Counsel for both Panos and Smiths moved the 
case forward efficiently to the point of briefing and preparing to 
argue Smith's motion for summary judgment on liability. Only at 
the hearing on Smith's Motion for Summary Judgment were present 
counsel informed, for the first time, that the case had been 
dismissed under Rule 4-103 over two years earlier. 
The procedural circumstances of this case confirm that the 
March 1992 dismissal was made under Rule 4-103 of the Utah Code of 
Judicial Administration. That rule established a procedure which 
allows trial courts to manage civil case processing and is designed 
to reduce the time between case filing and disposition. The rule 
states that if a certificate of readiness of trial has not been 
filed within a specified period of time, the court shall dismiss 
the case. That rule specifically provides that the dismissal will 
be "without prejudice for lack of prosecution." 
The Order to Show Cause was a form document sent out by Judge 
Moffat's clerk. The Court's Order of Dismissal is a form document 
incorporating the certificate of readiness for trial language of 
8 
Rule 4-103. Nowhere in any of those documents, including the Order 
of Dismissal, does it state that the appellant's claim is dismissed 
with prejudice. The language of Rule 4-103 makes it clear that the 
proceeding is designed to move cases forward quickly. If an action 
is dismissed under Rule 4-103, the action is taken off the court 
docket, and the plaintiff is not prejudiced because he has the 
ability to refile that claim within the applicable statute of 
limitations or savings statute. 
The March 1992 dismissal cannot be deemed a dismissal with 
prejudice and on the merits. Issues were never joined. Smiths had 
not even filed an answer at the time of dismissal. To deprive 
Panos his right to pursue this claim, through no fault of his own, 
is unreasonable, unjust, and contrary to Rule 4-103 and decisions 
of the Utah appeals courts. 
Utah appeals court decisions do not support a dismissal with 
prejudice for failure to prosecute, or for failure to obey a court 
order, under the facts of this case. In cases affirming such a 
dismissal with prejudice, the parties had been engaged in ongoing 
litigation for years and the plaintiff has showed inexcusable 
dilatory conduct in moving the case forward. For example, in 
Country Meadows v. Department of Health. 851 P.2d 1212 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1993), there had been five years of inactivity on the case, 
which the court deemed an "inexcusable abuse of the judicial 
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process." In Maxfield v. Rushton, 538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975), the 
plaintiff had made no attempts at discovery and had no medical 
expert to testify on the morning of trial. In Charlie Brown 
Construction v. Leisure Sports, Inc., 740 P.2d 1368 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987), the case had been inactive for three and a half years and 
counsel for the plaintiff did not show up for any of the pretrial 
conferences. In Hill v. Dickerson, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992), the plaintiffs were given a number of opportunities to 
designate expert witnesses and complete discovery. Still there was 
no expert to testify at the time of trial, when a second motion for 
continuance was made. Dismissal with prejudice under those 
circumstances was affirmed because of the plaintiff's own failure 
to designate expert witnesses and by abusing the opportunity to 
move her case forward. 
Finally, in Department of Social Services v. Romero, 609 P.2d 
1323 (Utah 1980), the defendant moved to have the plaintiff's 
complaint set aside for failure to prosecute after an adverse bench 
trial ruling. There had been no activity on the case for more than 
four years before trial. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court's denial of that motion to dismiss stating that, although the 
plaintiff had not moved the case forward for four years, "it does 
not appear that during the delay of which the defendant complains, 
he made any motion or any effort to move the case forward nor to 
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discover why that was not being done," Id. at 1324. While the 
facts of the Romero case are not analogous to the facts of this 
case, it is true that Smiths has never filed any motion for 
dismissal for failure to prosecute. Of course, Smiths could not 
have done that in the first action because it never entered an 
appearance nor filed an answer before the case was dismissed. 
This case is most similar to Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. 
v. Paul W. Larsen Construction, Inc., 544 P.2d 876 (Utah 1975). In 
that case, over a number of years, discovery was ongoing. A 
voluminous amount of documents were requested from Westinghouse 
which, rather than producing them, told counsel for the defendant 
that they could come and examine the documents. The defendant's 
counsel never made that examination and instead, served a motion to 
dismiss for failure to prosecute based on Westinghousefs failure to 
deliver those documents. The trial court granted the defendant's 
motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute. In its decision, the 
Utah Supreme Court laid out the elements to consider when 
evaluating such a motion: 
It is not to be doubted that in order to handle the 
business of the court with efficiency and expedition the 
trial court should have a reasonable latitude of 
discretion in dismissing for failure to prosecute if a 
party fails to move forward according to the rules and 
the directions of the court, without justifiable excuse. 
But that prerogative falls short of unreasonable and 
arbitrary action which will result in injustice. Whether 
there is such justifiable excuse is to be determined by 
considering more factors than merely the length of time 
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since the suit was filed. Some consideration should be 
given to the conduct of both parties, and for the 
opportunity each has had to move the case forward and 
what they have done about it; and also what difficulty or 
prejudice may have been caused to the other side; and 
most importantly, whether injustice may result from the 
dismissal. 
Id. at 878-79. 
In evaluating those elements, this case had been pending for 
just over one year at the time of dismissal. It appears that what 
happened is Panos's prior counsel filed the complaint and then 
granted Smiths an open extension in filing an answer while 
settlement discussions progressed. Certainly, Panos is not at 
fault in this case. Like both counsel, Panos knew nothing of the 
1992 dismissal until the June 17, 1994 hearing. As soon as he 
found out that Mr. Thurber had withdrawn as counsel, he contacted 
new counsel. New counsel entered his appearance and the case began 
moving forward through discovery and dispositive motions. Since 
both parties have been engaged in litigation, the case has moved 
forward efficiently, with both parties fulfilling their obligations 
to the court. Under those circumstances, no difficulty or 
prejudice is caused to Smiths if the dismissal is without 
prejudice. How could there be any such prejudice? Smiths did not 
even know of the 1992 dismissal until the June 17, 1994 hearing. 
Certainly severe injustice will result to Panos if the 1992 
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dismissal is deemed with prejudice. His personal injury claim is 
lost without adjudication. 
As was the case in Westinqhouse, the circumstances of this 
case are "unusual". The final observations of the Utah Supreme 
Court in Westinqhouse are relevant: 
It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch 
and to move calendars with expedition in order to keep 
them up to date. But it is even more important to keep 
in mind that the very reason for the existence of courts 
is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and to 
do justice between them. In conformity with that 
principle the courts generally tend to favor granting 
relief from default judgments where there is an 
reasonable excuse, unless it will result in substantial 
prejudice or injustice to the adverse party. 
It is our conclusion that the trial court failed to give 
proper weight to the higher priority; and that under the 
circumstances described herein, the order of dismissal 
was an abuse of discretion. 
Id. at 879. See also Maxfield v. Rushton. 779 P.2d 237 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the law and facts set forth above, the March 11, 1992 
dismissal was a dismissal without prejudice under Rule 4-103 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. That dismissal was not 
intended to be a dismissal with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41 (b) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Order of the trial 
Court, dismissing Panos's complaint with prejudice in Civil No. 
940904176 PI, was error. That Order Granting Defendant's Motion to 
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Dismiss should be vacated and this case should be remanded to the 
trial court for trial on the merits. 
in DATED this t , day of August, 1995. 
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE, L.C. 
GORftON K. JENSEN 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
Rule 4-103. Civil calendar management. 
Intent: 
To establish a procedure which allows the trial courts to manage civil case 
processing. 
To reduce the time between case filing and disposition. 
Applicability: 
This rule shall apply to the District and Circuit Courts. 
Statement of the Rule: 
(1) If a default judgment has not been entered by the plaintiff within 60 
days of the availability of default, the clerk shall mail written notification to 
the plaintiff stating that absent a showing of good cause by a date specified in 
the notification, the court shall dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of 
prosecution. 
(2) If a certificate of readiness for trial has not been served and filed within 
180 days of the filing date, the clerk shall mail written notification to the 
parties stating that absent a showing of good cause by a date specified in the 
notification, the court shall dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of 
prosecution. 
(3) Any party may, pursuant to the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, move to 
vacate a dismissal entered under this rule. 
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; May 1, 1993; May 15, 1994.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- The 1993 amendment added Subdivision (3). 
ment inserted "and absent a showing of good The 1994 amendment added the requirement 
cause" in Subdivision (1) and substituted of mailing written notification in Subdivisions 
"shall" for "may" in both subdivisions. (1) and (2). 
Rule 41. Dismissal of actions. 
(a) Voluntary dismissal; effect thereof. 
(1) By plaintiff; by stipulation. Subject to the provisions of Rule 
23(c), of Rule 66, and of any applicable statute, an action may be dis-
missed by the plaintiff without order of court (i) by filing a notice of 
dismissal at any time before service by the adverse party of an answer or 
of a motion for summary judgment, or (ii) by filing a stipulation of dismis-
sal signed by all parties who have appeared in the action. Unless other-
wise stated in the notice of dismissal or stipulation, the dismissal is with-
out prejudice, except that a notice of dismissal operates as an adjudication 
upon the merits when filed by a plaintiff who has once dismissed in any 
court of the United States or of any state an action based on or including 
the same claim. 
(2) By order of court. Except as provided in Paragraph (1) of this 
subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiffs 
instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions 
as the court deems proper. If a counterclaim has been pleaded by a defen-
dant prior to the service upon him of the plaintiffs motion to dismiss, the 
action shall not be dismissed against the defendant's objection unless the 
counterclaim can remain pending for independent adjudication by the 
court. Unless otherwise specified in the order, a dismissal under this 
paragraph is without prejudice. 
(b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to 
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of court, a defendant may 
move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against him. After the plaintiff, 
in an action tried by the court without a jury, has completed the presentation 
of his evidence the defendant, without waiving his right to offer evidence in 
the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground 
that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The 
court as trier of the facts may then determine them and render judgment 
against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of 
all the evidence. If the court renders judgment on the merits against the 
plaintiff, the court shall make findings as provided in Rule 52(a). Unless the 
court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this 
subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this rule, other than a 
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper venue or for lack of an indis-
pensable party, operates as an adjudication upon the merits. 
(c) Dismissal of counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim. The 
provisions of this rule apply to the dismissal of any counterclaim, cross-claim, 
or third-party claim. A voluntary dismissal by the claimant alone pursuant to 
Paragraph (1) of Subdivision (a) of this rule shall be made before a responsive 
pleading is served or, if there is none, before the introduction of evidence at 
the trial or hearing. 
(d) Costs of previously-dismissed action. If a plaintiff who has once 
dismissed an action in any court commences an action based upon or including 
the same claim against the same defendant, the court may make such order 
for the payment of costs of the action previously dismissed as it may deem 
proper and may stay the proceedings in the action until the plaintiff has 
complied with the order. 
(e) Bond or undertaking to be delivered to adverse party. Should a 
party dismiss his complaint, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, 
pursuant to Subdivision (a)(l)(i) above, after a provisional remedy has been 
allowed such party, the bond or undertaking filed in support of such provi-
sional remedy must thereupon be delivered by the court to the adverse party 
against whom such provisional remedy was obtained. 
Compiler's Notes. — Subdivisions (a) to (d) 
of this rule are substantially similar to Rule 
41, F.R.C.P. 
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Stephen G. Morgan, No. 2315 
Mitchel T. Rice, No. 6022 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7888 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN PANOS, 
Plaintiff, : ORDER 
:
 *n chinas 
SMITH'S FOOD & DRUG CENTER, : Civil No. 9-3 00 01125 PI 
INC., 
: Judge Richard Moffat 
Defendant, 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on the Motion 
for an Order Vacating the Order of Dismissal entered on March 11, 
1992 of John Panes, Plaintiff in the above-entitled action, with 
Gordon K. Jensen appearing as attorney for Plaintiff, and Mitchel 
T. Rice appearing as attorney for Defendant Smith's Food and Drug 
Centers, Inc.; and 
After reading the Motion tc Vacate Dismissal and Memorandum in 
Support thereof, and the Memorandum in Opposition -hereto, ar.d 
after consideration of the argument of counsel fcr Plaintiff and 
Defendant, 
IT IS ORDERED THAT: 
1. The Motion for an Order Vacating the Order of Dismissal 
entered on March 11. 1992 is hereby denied. 
Dated this / day of 
BY THE COURT 
re
1994. 
n \ly- RONALD 0. HYDE 1 
"^" District Court Judge 
raPTTT?TeATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the ^ f^day of June, 1994, I caused 
a true and correct copy of the ORDER to be Hand-Delivered to th« 
following: 
Gordon K. Jensen 
LEHMAN, JENSEN & DONAHUE 
136 South Main Street, Suite 721 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
*. 
Stephen G. Morgan, No. 2315 
Mitchel T. Rice, No, 6022 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Keams Building, Eighth Floor 
13 6 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7888 
Deputy Cte^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN PANOS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SMITH'S FOOD & DRUG CENTERS, 
INC., 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Civil No. 940904176 PI 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Defendant, 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on the Motion 
to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint of Smith's Food & Drug Centers, 
Inc., Defendant in the above-entitled action, with Gordon K. Jensen 
appearing as attorney for Plaintiff, and Mitchel T. Rice appearing 
as attorney for Defendant Smith's Food and Drug Centers, Inc.; and 
Azzer reading the Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in Support 
thereof, the Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to 
the exhibits attached tc said Memoranda, and Affidavits, r i s m . s s 
ar.c a : : e r ccr.sidsrazicr. c : cr.e argume: cz ccur.s6. 
anc wSTrr.Car.-, 
The Court finds that the Order of Dismissal entered by Judge 
Richard H. Moffat on March 11, 1992, in John Panos v. Smith's Food 
King, Civil No. 910901425, was made pursuant to Rule 4Kb) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and operated as an adjudication upon 
the merits of the case, and 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT: 
1. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby granted; 
2. Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant Smith's Food & 
Drug Centers, Inc. is hereby dismissed with prejudice; 
3. Defendant Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc. is awarded 
its costs of the acti.on as are allowed by law. 
Dated this 3 ^ day of <t-£-(o fu^^>w( ,
 1995i 
BY THE COURT 
ANNE M. STIRS. 
D i s t r i c t Cou; rt Jttscg_ \^Q*=££^-/ 
2 
